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Abstract 
Different goods are produced by different sectors in an economy. The fact that sectors use different production 
technologies is named technology-bias. The technology-bias is well documented and has important theoretical 
implications for economic growth and unemployment. We provide a theoretical model that explains the 
technology-bias and its development. We provide empirical evidence on the development of the technology-bias 
and explain this development by using our model-results. Last not least, we discuss the implications of our 
findings for the existing growth literature and structural change literature. 
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1. Introduction 
Different goods are produced by different sectors in an economy. In general, we can say that 
each sector has its own specific production technology. That is, technology differs across 
sectors. This fact is named “cross-sector technology bias”. Many multi-sector models assume 
the existence of such a technology bias and many models imply that this bias has important 
impacts on the aggregate growth rate of the economy and on unemployment. (For some 
references, see section 8.) 
The aim of the paper is to provide a long-run growth model, which can explain the existence 
of technology-bias endogenously. Especially, we focus on cross-sector bias regarding capital-
intensities, output-elasticities of capital and factor-income-shares. That is, we analyze why 
output-elasticities of capital and thus capital-intensities differ across sectors and we analyze 
how these differences develop over time. We also provide empirical evidence on this 
question. 
Our model is a sort of multi-sector Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans-model. General technology 
breakthroughs are exogenous. They have to be implemented to improve the technology of 
sectors. Implementation requires some creative ideas and, hence, depends upon the amount of 
labor employed in a sector. 
To our knowledge, the following literature is related to our paper: 
1.) There is some literature, which endogenizes the cross-sector bias in TFP, for example 
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006) and Ngai and Samaniego (2011). For an overview of this 
literature, see Ngai and Samaniego (2011). In contrast to this literature, we focus on 
endogenizing the cross-sector bias in output-elasticity of capital.2  
2.) Zuleta and Young (2007) present a two-sector model where a “backward sector” uses 
labor only and a “progressive sector” uses labor and capital; the output elasticity of capital in 
the progressive sector can be increased by investment. Due to these assumptions the backward 
sector cannot catch-up (since it cannot use capital), i.e. the technologies cannot converge. In 
contrast, we focus on the catching-up process of the backward sector. 
                                                 
2 To see what the exact difference between our paper and the papers, which endogenize the TFP-growth rate, 
consider the paper by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006) as an example: The implicit sectoral production functions 
of Acemoglu and Guerrieri’s (2006)-model are depicted on page 15 of their paper (equation (27)). In fact these 
functions are of type Cobb-Douglas, like in our model. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006) endogenize the TFP 
(  and ) of these production functions on page 36 of their paper (equations (61)). Hence, we can say that 
the bias of TFP is endogenous in their model. However, the output-elasticities of inputs (
1M 2M
1α  and 2α ) are not 
endogenized in their model. That is, the bias of output-elasticities of inputs is exogenous in their model. We 
focus on the bias of output-elasticities of inputs; i.e., we try to analyze why 1α  and 2α  are different and how 
this difference develops over time. 
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Our theoretical results imply that sectoral technologies may converge or diverge, depending 
upon the sort of technological implementation (labor-augmenting or capital-augmenting), 
structural change patterns (i.e. changes in factor-allocation across sectors), distribution of 
capital-production across sectors and the nature of the breakthrough. Our empirical results 
imply that sector-technologies converged between 1948 and 1987 in the USA, which may be 
explained by prevalence of capital-augmenting technological implementation in the past 
and/or increasing employment-shares of technologically backward sectors. 
Overall, our model implies that models, which assume exogenous technology-bias, omit 
important dynamics of structural change and aggregate growth. The reason is that technology-
bias tends to be self-reinforcing, causes structural change (cross-technology factor-
reallocation) and is affected itself by cross-technology factor reallocation. For a detailed 
discussion of model-implications for the existing literature see section 8. 
In the next section, we present the assumptions and the equilibrium of the model. In section 3 
we discuss the dynamics of the model when no technological breakthroughs occur. In section 
4 we study the impacts of a sequence of technology breakthroughs on the sectoral technology-
bias (via implementation). In section 5 we study how general structural-change-patterns affect 
the implementation of breakthroughs at sector level. Section 6 provides a summary of the 
factors which have an impact on the development of the technology-bias in our model. In 
section 7 we provide some evidence on the development of the sectoral technology bias. In 
section 8 we discuss the implications of our results for the existing literature. In section 9 we 
provide some concluding remarks. 
 
2 Model assumptions 
2.1 Production 
Assumption 1:  Many heterogeneous goods ( ni ,...1= ) are produced in the economy; each 
good i is produced by a subsector i. 
Assumption 2: Goods/subsectors mi ,...1=  are assigned to sector A; goods/subsectors 
nmi ,...1+=  are assigned to sector B ( . This is only a simplifying 
assumption; in fact, our arguments work even when there are more than two 
sectors. 
)mn >
Assumption 3: Capital (K) and labor (L) are inputs in Cobb-Douglas production functions. 
Assumption 4: Technology is homogenous within a sector but differs across sectors; i.e. there 
is technology bias across sectors but not within sectors. For example, all 
subsectors  have the same technology, but subsectors  have mi ,...1= mi ,...1=
4 
 
not the same technology as subsectors nmi ,...1+= . Again, this is only a 
simplifying assumption without implications for our main results. It helps us to 
model the independency assumption in the next subsection. 
Assumption 5: The degree of implementation of a general technological breakthrough 
depends upon the number of persons who are employed in a sector. That is, the 
more persons are employed in a sector, the better a technological breakthrough 
is implemented. This is a very important assumption; it is discussed extensively 
in Section 2.4.  
Assumption 6: The implementation of a general technological breakthrough affects the TFP-
growth rate and the output elasticity of capital and labor respectively. That is, 
implementation affects the marginal rate of technical substitution between 
capital and labor and thus the optimal capital intensity of a sector. Again, this is 
a very important assumption, which will be discussed extensively in Section 
2.4. 
 
These assumptions imply the following production functions of subsectors i: 
(1a)  miKkLlAY Lli
Ll
ii
AA ,...1,)()( )(1)( == −αα
where  
(1b) 1)(0 << LlAα  
(1c) )( Llg
A
A
AA=
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=
≡
m
i
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where  denotes the output of good i;  and  denote respectively the fraction of labor and 
capital devoted to production of good i  (i.e.  is the employment share of subsector i and  
is the capital share of sector i); 
iY il ik
il ik
K  is the aggregate capital;  is aggregate labor; A (B) is a 
technology parameter of sector A (B). Note that I omit here the time index. Furthermore, note 
that the index i denotes goods/subsectors.  and  denote respectively the employment 
shares of sector A and sector B. We will define additional sector-variables later. 
L
Al Bl
The fact that the TFP-growth rates (  and ) and the subsectoral output-elasticities of 
inputs (
Ag Bg
)( LlAα  and )( LlBβ ) depend upon sectoral employment (equations (1b,c) and (2b,c)) 
comes from Assumptions 5 and 6. We discuss in Section 2.4 which assumptions are 
reasonable for the functional forms of )( LlAα , )( LlBβ ,  and . )( Llg AA )( Llg BB
 
Assumption 7: All capital and all labor are used in the production of goods :  ni ,...1=
(3) ∑∑
==
==
n
i
i
n
i
i kl
11
1;1  
 
Assumption 8: The amount of available labor grows at exogenous rate ( ): Lg
(4) LgL
L ≡&  
 
Assumption 9: All goods are consumed. Furthermore, only the good m can be used as capital. 
(Note, that the model could be modified such that more than one good is used 
as capital e.g. in the manner of Ngai and Pissarides (2007).)  
This assumption implies: 
(5) miCY ii ≠∀= ,  
(6)  KKCY mm δ++= &
where  denotes consumption of good i; iC δ  denotes the constant depreciation rate of capital. 
 
Assumption 10: Each subsector consists of many identical, marginalistic and profit-
maximizing producers. There are no patent-rights; productivity-improving 
(accidental) inventions spill over to other producers immediately. (Eventual 
departures from this assumption are discussed in Section 9.) Overall, there is 
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perfect competition in each subsector. Furthermore, there is perfect factor-
mobility within and across sectors.  
This assumption implies that individual entrepreneurs have no incentive to undertake 
some costly action to increase their individual ability to implement a technology 
breakthrough.3 They do not undertake (costly) individual research nor do they increase 
the amount of learning-by-doing deliberately by increasing the factor-input above the 
perfect-competition optimum. Rather, they behave as producers in perfect-competition 
environment. For some discussion and the impacts of the departure from this 
assumption see Sections 2.4 and 9. 
 
These assumptions imply that entrepreneurs regard prices, factor-prices and technology-
parameters as exogenous (i.e. determined by the market). That is, the entrepreneurs are price-
takers and technology-takers (i.e. they consider α , β ,  and  as exogenous). Hence, 
profit maximization and perfect factor mobility imply the following optimality conditions: 
Ag Bg
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where  is the real wage rate, w r  is the real rental rate of capital and  is the price of good i 
(and correspondingly  is the price of good 
ip
mp mi = ). 
By using equations (1)-(3) these optimality conditions can be reformulated as follows: 
(7a) 
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3 Consider the following explanations to understand why individual entrepreneurs have no incentive to undertake 
any costly action to improve their productivity in such an environment (immediate spill-overs and no patent 
rights): An individual entrepreneur, who undertakes some costly action to improve the production process, bears 
the costs of this action and the profit from the productivity improvement. All other entrepreneurs would have the 
same productivity improvements, but no costs from the costly action. Hence, they could reduce their prices more 
than the inventing entrepreneur could. Hence, the inventing entrepreneur would loose competitiveness and drop 
out of the market. 
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Note that these equations were derived under the assumption that α , β ,  and  are 
exogenous for the producers, due to Assumption 10.  
Ag Bg
 
2.2 Households 
Now, we assume that there are many marginalistic households. We assume here that 
households are identical, although many dimensions of household-heterogeneity could be 
introduced into this model without much mathematical difficulties. However, household-
heterogeneity will be a topic of a separate paper. 
In the following, the superfix ι  denotes the corresponding variable of the individual 
household. For example, while E  stands for consumption expenditures of the whole 
economy, ιE  stands for consumption expenditures of the household ι . We assume that there 
is an arbitrary and large number of households ( x,...1=ι ), sufficiently large to constitute 
marginalistic behavior of households.  
We assume the following utility function, which is quite similar to the utility function used by 
Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001): 
 (8a) ,     ιριιι ∀= ∫∞ − ,),...(
0
1 dteCCuU
t
n 0>ρ  
where 
(8b) ι  θ ωιιιι ∀⎥⎦
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(8d)  i
n
mi
i ∀=∑
+= 1
0ιθ
(8e) ∑  =
i
i 1ω
where ι  denotes the consumption of good i by household iC ι ; ρ  is the time-preference rate. 
ι  can be interpreted as a subsistence level (if ι  is positive) or as a an endowment (if ι  is 
negative) of household 
θi θi θi
ι  regarding good i (see also e.g. Kongsamut et al. (2001)). In fact this 
preference structure is non-homothetic across goods in general; hence, increasing income is 
associated with demand-shifts across goods as shown by Kongsamut et al. (2001). 
Furthermore, this preference-structure features a non-unitary price elasticity of demand; 
hence, structural change may be caused by relative-price-changes as discussed by Ngai and 
Pissarides (2007). 
Restrictions (8c,d) are imposed here for analytical reasons. They simplify the analysis and 
help us to isolate the determinants of technology-bias. They allow for the existence of a 
partially balanced growth path (see later), which makes our dynamic analysis traceable. 
Furthermore, they allow us to determine exogenously whether factor reallocation takes place 
across technology or not: in fact, restrictions (8c,d) prevent factor reallocation across 
technology A and B. Hence, later we will be able to determine whether factor reallocation 
across technology takes place or not, which is helpful for isolating the determinants of 
technology convergence/divergence, as we will see. 
Furthermore, each household has the following dynamic constraint: 
(9) ιδ ιιι ∀−−+= ,)( EWrLwW&  
where  is the wealth/assets of household ιW ι , ιE  are consumption expenditures of household 
ι  and L  is the (exogenous) labor-supply of household ι . The latter implies that each 
household supplies the same amount of labor at the market.  
The dynamic constraint (A.17) is standard (compare for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004), p.88). It implies that the wealth of the household increases by labor-income and by 
(net-) interest-rate-payments and decreases by consumption expenditures. 
Note that I assume that the labor supply of each household is exogenously determined. 
Consumption expenditures of a household are given by 
(10) ι  ιι ∀= ∑ ,
i
iiCpE
Each household maximizes its life-time-utility (8) subject to its dynamic constraint (9)-(10). 
Since this optimization problem is time-separable (due to the assumption of separable time-
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preference and marginalistic household), it can be divided into two steps; see also, e.g., 
Foellmi and Zweimüller (2008), p.1320f:  
1.) Intratemporal (static) optimization: For a given level of consumption-budget ( ιE ), the 
household optimizes the allocation of consumption-budget across goods.  
2.) Intertemporal (dynamic) optimization: The household determines the optimal allocation of 
consumption-budget across time. 
 
Intratemporal optimization: 
The household maximizes its instantaneous utility (8b-d) subject to the constraint (9)-(10), 
where it regards the consumption-budget ( ιE ) and prices ( ) as exogenous. (Remember that 
the household is price-taker.) This yields the following optimality conditions: 
ip
(11a) ιθθω
ω ιιιι ,, i
p
CC i
i
mm
m
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 (11b) ιω
θιι ∀−= ,
m
mmCE  
 
Intertemporal optimization 
Inserting the intratemporal optimality conditions into the instantaneous utility function yields 
after some algebra (where we use here equations (7c,d) as well): 
(12a) ιωωι ∀+−= ,lnln(.) BB pEu  
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Now, we have determined the instantaneous utility as function of consumption-budget (and 
prices). (Remember that the household is price-taker, i.e. prices are exogenous from the 
household’s point of view.) Inserting (12) into (8) yields 
(13) ( ) ιωω ριι ∀+−= ∫∞ − ,lnln
0
dtepEU tBB  
Thus, the intertemporal optimization problem is to optimize (13) subject to the dynamic 
constraint (9). This is a typical optimal control problem, which can be solved by using a 
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Hamiltonian. ιE  is control-variable and  is state variable. The prices ( ) and factor 
prices (  and 
ιW Bp
w δ−r ) are regarded by the household as exogenous (since the household is 
marginalistic and thus price-taker.) Remember that L  is exogenous. 
In this way we can obtain the following intertemporal optimality condition after some algebra: 
(14) ιρδι
ι
∀−−= ,r
E
E&  
Note that here and in the following we use use(d) good mi =   as numeraire; thus  
(15)  1=mp
 
2.3 Aggregates, equilibrium and market clearing 
We define now aggregate output (Y) as follows: 
(16a)  ∑
=
≡
n
i
iiYpY
1
Aggregate consumption expenditures (E), aggregate consumption of good i ( ) and 
aggregate subsistence needs/endowments (
iC
iθ ) are given by the sum of their individual 
counterparts respectively, i.e.  
(16b)           ∑∑
=
=≡
n
i
iiCpEE
1ι
ι
(16c)  iCC ii ∀=∑ ,
ι
ι
(16d)  iii ∀= ∑ ,
ι
ιθθ
We assume that all markets are in equilibrium and there is market clearing. That is equations 
for the goods-market-clearing (5) and (6) hold. There is no unemployment, i.e. labor-market-
clearing requires 
(17) ∑=
ι
LL  
Last not least, since the wealth/assets can only be invested in production-capital (K), the 
following relation must be true if there is capital-market-clearing 
(18)  ∑=
ι
ιWK
(see also, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), p.97). That is, all assets are invested in capital 
(capital-market-clearing). 
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By using these aggregate definitions, market clearing conditions and the optimality conditions 
from the previous sections, we can obtain the following equations describing the development 
of aggregates, sectors and subsectors after some algebra: 
 
Subsectors: 
(19) i
p
CC i
i
mm
m
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i ∀+−= ,θθω
ω  
 
Sectors: 
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Aggregates: 
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Note that in these equations α  and β  are still functions of sectoral employment, i.e. 
( LlA )αα =  and ( )LlBββ = . However, we omitted the functional arguments for the sake of 
clarity of the formulas. 
Now the remaining task is to define the functions ( )LlAαα =  and ( LlB )ββ = . This is done in 
the following section. 
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2.4 Technological progress and its implementation 
2.4.1 General breakthroughs and their implementation 
We assume that some general technological breakthroughs occur during our observation 
period. Such breakthroughs may be rare “big breakthroughs”, which have fundamental and 
long-lasting impacts on the production-structure of the economy. Examples of such 
breakthroughs may be inventions which lead to Kondratjew-waves (e.g. steam engine, micro-
chip). On the other hand the breakthroughs in our model may be as well some “smaller 
inventions” which occur more frequently.  
We do not model the emergence of such breakthroughs endogenously. In fact, this has been 
done in endogenous growth theory (in research and development models). Why such 
breakthroughs occur and at which rate they occur is not in focus of our model anyway. We are 
rather interested in the pattern of their implementation across sectors. Studying this pattern 
does not necessarily require endogenous modeling of technological breakthroughs. Therefore, 
we keep them exogenous. However, we may imagine that such breakthroughs come from 
basic research. 
There are two important aspects regarding the effects of such breakthroughs on production. 
1.) General technological breakthroughs, such as electricity or microchip, do not directly 
improve the technologies of sectors and industries. Rather a lot of research, ideas 
and/or inventions are necessary to implement a general breakthrough at sector level. 
For example, improvements in productivity of services, which come from the 
invention of the microchip, required a lot of ideas and research in software 
programming and hardware before they increased the productivity of services. That is, 
general breakthroughs require further breakthroughs to be implemented. Hence, we 
can distinguish between general breakthroughs and “implementation breakthroughs”. 
2.) Depending upon the industry or sector, different sorts of ideas are necessary to 
improve the production technology. The improvement of the productivity of a banker 
by using a microchip requires different sorts of knowledge/ideas in comparison to the 
improvement of the productivity of a car-producer by a microchip. In other words, 
each industry/sector requires its own sector-specific ideas/knowledge/inventions to 
implement a general breakthrough. Therefore, we assume that there are no spill-overs 
between sectors. (On the other hand, within a sector or industry strong spill-overs may 
exist.) Note that there is some discussion about spill-overs across sectors. For 
example, it is argued that technological development in the manufacturing sector has 
led to productivity-improvements in the services sector. This fact could be modeled as 
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a spill-over effect from manufacturing to services. However, at the same time these 
inventions in the manufacturing could be modeled as general breakthroughs, which 
have to be implemented in services (and manufacturing). We choose the latter way of 
modeling. 
These two points are essential for the cross-sector technology-bias, since the need for sector 
specific ideas to implement breakthroughs constitutes a basis for cross-sector technology bias. 
 
The following assumption is aimed to keep our analysis traceable: 
Assumption 11: The implementation of a general breakthrough occurs within a finite period 
of time after the happening of the breakthrough. 
Although we may also think of the implementation process as lasting forever, we have to 
restrict the period of time in order to keep our model solvable. In some sense, we may 
imagine that the relevant/important part of the implementation occurs in some finite period; 
the impacts of implementations, which happen long time after the breakthrough has happened, 
may be less relevant (in comparison to the impacts of the implementations of newer 
breakthroughs). 
 
 
2.4.2 The relation between sector-size and degree of implementation 
We assume that the degree of implementation of a general breakthrough depends upon the 
size of a sector. We can think of two aspects which relate sector size to the degree of 
implementation: 
1.) The more labor is employed in a sector, the more creative power is concentrated on the 
production processes of a sector. Hence, the probability that an implementation-idea 
arises during the production process is higher. This aspect is closely related to 
learning-by-doing-models of endogenous-growth. Overall, we can assume that the 
more labor is employed in a sector the better the technology improvement through 
implementation of general breakthroughs. The ideas on implementation of a 
breakthrough occur accidentally in our model. 
2.) Implementation research may require the overcoming of large fix costs and sunk-cost 
and may be associated with high risk. Hence, large sectors may have more financial 
power to overcome such costs. 
3.) Of course, there are further aspects, which may relate market-size to degree of 
implementation, for example the relationship between market-size and competition 
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and incentives to be competitive/innovative. However, I have no clear ideas on 
straightforward/unambiguous chains of arguments regarding this. For some related 
discussion, see e.g. Klevorick et al. (1995) and Pavitt (1985). Note that “market-size” 
of a sector (i.e. the sector’s share in aggregate output) is not the same as sector-size 
(which we measure by sector’s employment share; see later Assumption 12): Even a 
very large market may have a very small sector-size, if, e.g., the production process is 
very capital-intensive (thus relatively few labor is employed to produce a large value 
of output). 
 
Overall, we can summarize this discussion in the following assumption: 
Assumption 12: There is a positive relationship between sector-size and degree of 
implementation of breakthroughs. That is, the bigger the sector, the 
stronger the technology-improvement through implementation of a 
breakthrough. Sector-size is measured by relative employment-shares of 
the sectors ( ): The higher the employment share of a sector, the larger 
the size of the sector. 
BA ll ,
Note that this assumption is reflected by the fact that we have expressed our production 
function parameters as functions of sectoral employment, i.e. we assumed ( )LlAαα = , 
( )LlBββ = ,  and )( Llgg AAA = )( Llgg BBB =  That is, we measure sector-size by its 
employment share. This seems to be the first choice, since creativity requires the involvement 
of humans. 
 
2.4.3 The impacts of implementation on sector technology 
We assume that the implementation of a breakthrough does not only affect the TFP-growth 
rate but also the output-elasticity of inputs. That is, when a breakthrough is implemented, the 
marginal rate of technological substitution is affected. Thus, the optimal capital intensity of a 
sector changes through implementation.  
Acemoglu (2002) provides a discussion and “microfoundation” of this fact. In a model, where 
technological progress may be labor-augmenting and capital-augmenting, he shows that 
technological progress leads to changes of factor-income-shares and marginal rate of technical 
substitution. If technological progress is labor-augmenting (capital-augmenting), the labor-
income-share (capital-income-share) increases.  
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Since this form of microfoundation is quite complex, we omit it here in order to keep our 
model traceable. Instead, we simply assume that implementation affects the parameter of our 
Cobb-Douglas production function and we distinguish two cases: 
 
Assumption 13: 
1.) If implementation is capital-augmenting, the output-elasticity (and thus 
the income-share) of capital increases and the TFP-growth rate 
increases. That is, ( )LlAα  and/or ( )LlBβ  decreases and  and/or  
increases.  
Ag Bg
2.) On the other hand, if implementation is labor-augmenting, the labor-
income-share increases and the TFP-growth rate increases. That is, 
( LlA )α  and/or ( )LlBβ  increases and  and/or  increases. We know 
from standard growth theory (e.g. Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model) that 
the equilibrium growth rate of output is among others given by the 
TFP-growth rate divided by the output-elasticity of labor, e.g. 
Ag Bg
α/Ag . 
Later, we will see that in our model the PBGP-growth rate is given by 
α/Ag . Hence, an increase in α  reduces the equilibrium growth rate. In 
general, technological progress is not associated with a decrease in the 
equilibrium growth rate. Therefore, in the case of labor-augmenting 
technological progress we assume that the increase in  is stronger 
than the increase in 
Ag
α ; hence the equilibrium growth rate  α/Ag  
increases. (The same arguments apply to sector B; i.e. we assume that 
labor-augmenting technological progress increases β/Bg .) 
 
2.4.4 Summary of the impacts of a technological breakthrough 
Now, we can sum up the discussion of section 2.4 as follows: 
We assume that several technological breakthroughs occur over time. Each breakthrough is 
implemented over a finite period of time. The implementation of a breakthrough in a sector 
improves the technology of all subsectors which belong to this sector (within-sector spill-
overs). However, the subsectors that belong to the other sector do not profit from this 
implementation (no cross-sector spill-overs). If the breakthrough is implemented in sector A 
(B),  ( ) increases; the increase in  ( ) is the stronger, the higher  ( ) is. 
Regarding the impacts on output-elasticites of inputs we have to consider two cases: 
Ag Bg Ag Bg LlA LlB
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1.) Implementation is labor-augmenting: Implementation in sector A (B) increases α  
( β ), where the increase in α  ( β ) is the stronger, the higher  ( ) is. The 
overall-change in 
LlA LlB
α/Ag  ( β/Bg ) is positive. 
2.) Implementation is capital-augmenting: Implementation in sector A (B) decreases α  
( β ), where the decrease in α  ( β ) is the stronger, the higher  ( ) is. LlA LlB
 
In fact, the model is now fully specified and can now analyze the development of technology-
bias over time. In the next section we analyze the model-dynamics when there are no 
breakthroughs. Then, in section 4, we analyze how a technology break-through affects this 
technology-bias. In section 5, we study the impact of structural change on this relationship. 
Afterward, there are several sections in which we discuss and summarize our results. 
 
3 Dynamics of the model without technological breakthroughs 
In this section we assume that there are no technological breakthroughs; hence, α , β  ,  
and  are exogenous and constant. 
Ag
Bg
 
Definition 1: A partially balanced growth path (PBGP) is an equilibrium growth path where 
aggregates (Y, K and E) grow at a constant rate. 
 
Note that this definition does require balanced growth for aggregate variables. However, it 
does not require balanced growth for subsectoral variables (e.g. for subsectoral outputs). 
 
Lemma 1: When α , β  ,  and  are assumed to be exogenous and constant, equations 
(22) to (24) imply that there exists a unique PBGP, where aggregates (Y, K, and E) grow at 
constant rate  and where  is constant. The PBGP-growth rate is given by 
Ag Bg
*g mm kl /
L
A ggg += α
* .  
Proof: is self-evident. 
 
Lemma 2: a) A saddle-path, along which the economy converges to the PBGP, exists in the 
neighborhood of the PBGP. b) The PBGP is locally stable. 
Proof: See APPENDIX. 
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Lemma 2 ensures that, if a technological breakthrough shifts the economy away from the 
PBGP, the economy will converge to the PBGP again, provided that the departure from the 
PBGP is not too strong. 
 
Lemma 3: Along the PBGP, labor is not reallocated betwee sectors A and B. That is, labor is 
not reallocated across technology, i.e.  and  are constant. Al Bl
Proof: This lemma is implied by equations (20) and (21) and by Lemma1. Q.E.D. 
 
Note, however, that it can be easily shown that labor is reallocated within each of the sectors 
A and B. Furthermore, note that in section 5 we will allow for labor reallocation between 
sectors A and B. 
 
4 Impacts of a technological breakthrough: self-reinforcing technology-
convergence/divergence 
Now we study how a technology breakthrough affects the situation described in the previous 
section. We assume an initial situation where the technologies differ across sectors.  
As discussed in section 2.4, we assume that a technology breakthrough induces a finite period 
of time where the breakthrough is implemented. During this period of implementation, the 
sectoral technologies change. When the implementation-period is finished, the economy 
converges to the new PBGP.4
As we will show now, the change in sectoral technologies during the implementation-period 
leads to a change of cross-technology factor-allocation ( , ). The change in this allocation 
affects the ability of the sectors to implement the next breakthrough (see e.g. section 2.4.4). 
Hence, over time (and over a sequence of breakthroughs) the sectoral technologies may 
converge or diverge over time.  
Al Bl
We will elaborate now the factors that determine whether the technologies converge or 
diverge. To do so we calculate the employment shares along the PBGP. By using equations 
(20)/(21) and some of the equations from APPENDIX we obtain the following employment 
shares along the PBGP: 
                                                 
4 Note that the discussion in APPENDIX implies that the PBGP-values of the economy depend upon the 
technology parameters of the production functions.  Hence, we know that technology-implementation leads to a 
departure from the old PBGP and convergence to the new PBGP (after the period of implementation is finished). 
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An asterisk denotes here the PBGP-value. 
 
These equations imply that: 
(27) 00
**
<∂
∂>∂
∂
ββ
AB ll  
(28) 00
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>∂
∂<∂
∂
αα
AB ll  
Note that in the calculation of (28), we assumed that an increase in α  is associated with an 
increase in , such that Ag α/Ag  increases if α  increases, according to our discussion in point 
2) of Assumption 13. 
 
Now we can postulate the following: 
 
Theorem 1: Implementation of breakthroughs leads to a change in the PBGP-values of the 
employment-shares of sectors A and B (  and ). That is, implementation of breakthroughs 
leads to cross-technology labor-reallocation. 
Al Bl
Proof: This theorem is implied by equations (27)/(28) and Assumption 13. Q.E.D. 
 
Note that this theorem holds even if implementation is such that α  and β  increase by the 
same amount. The reason is the following: a change in α  and/or β  leads to a change in 
average economy-wide output-elasticity of labor; i.e. the average capital-intensity of the 
economy (K/L) changes (as implied by Lemma 1). Since sector A (and especially subsector 
m) produces capital, a change in average capital intensity affects the employment-share of 
sector A, ceteris paribus. (See also equations (20) and (21) and note that aggregate investment 
is equal to EY − ).  
Of course in general, the change in  and  does not only come from this change in 
aggregate capital demand. Additionally, the following fact determines the allocation ( , ): 
Al Bl
Al Bl
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Optimal factor-allocation across sectors is determined by the profitability of factor-inputs in 
sectors, since we assume perfect factor mobility across sectors. That is, sectors, which have 
relatively high output-elasticity of labor, employ more labor in comparison to sectors, which 
have relatively low output-elasticity of labor. (Previously, this fact has been shown by 
Acemogly and Guerrieri (2008) in another model.) Therefore, a change in cross-sector 
technology-bias ( β
α ) induces an adjustment of factor-input-shares, such that optimal factor-
input-shares are achieved. To understand this fact, note that equations (20) and (21) imply that 
a change in β
α  induces a change in ( , ) even if we keep , E and Y constant. Al Bl mm kl /
Hence, we can postulate the following corollary: 
Corollary from Theorem 1: The change in cross-technology labor allocation ( , ), which 
has been postulated in Theorem 1, comes from two forces:  
Al Bl
1.) A change in sectoral output-elasticities of inputs affects the aggregate capital demand; 
since only sector A produces capital, the changes in aggregate capital demand induce factor-
reallocation across sectors A and B. 
2.) A change in cross-sector technology-bias ( )/ βα  changes the optimal factor-allocation 
across sectors. Thus, when there is free factor-mobility across sectors, cross-sector factor 
reallocations are induced in order to achieve the new optimal cross-sector factor allocation. 
 
Theorem 1 is the basis for technology convergence and divergence, since cross-sector labor-
reallocation changes the sector’s relative potential to implement future breakthroughs 
(according to Assumption 13). 
 
According to the discussion in section 2.4.4 we distinguish between two cases. 
1.) Implementation is labor-augmenting 
According to our discussion in section 2.4.4 and equations (27)/(28) we can postulate the 
following causal chain: A breakthrough leads to implementation in sector A (B), which 
leads to increase in )(βα , which leads to increase in  ( ), which leads to better 
implementation of the next breakthrough.  
LlA LlB
2.) Implementation is capital-augmenting 
According to our discussion in section 2.4.4 and equations (27)/(28) we can postulate the 
following causal chain: A breakthrough leads to implementation in sector A (B), which 
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leads to a decrease in )(βα , which leads to a decrease in  ( ), which leads to 
weaker implementation of the next breakthrough. 
LlA LlB
 
Hence, we can postulate the following theorem: 
Theorem 2: a) If implementation is labor-augmenting, the implementation of a breakthrough 
in sector A (B) increases the employment-share of sector A (B). If implementation is capital-
augmenting, the implementation of a breakthrough in sector A (B) reduces the employment-
share of sector A (B). 
b) If implementation is labor-augmenting, the implementation of a breakthrough in sector A 
(B) increases the ability of sector A (B) to implement the next breakthrough. If implementation 
is capital-augmenting, the implementation of a breakthrough in sector A (B) reduces the 
ability of sector A (B) to implement the next breakthrough. 
Proof: This theorem is implied by equations (27)/(28) and Assumptions 12 and 13. Q.E.D. 
 
Definition 2: Technology-bias is defined as βα − . The higher βα − , the stronger 
technology-bias. 
 
Theorem 3: Provided that there is a sequence of technological breakthroughs over a period 
of time, the following factors jointly determine whether technology-bias decreases or 
increases over this period of time: 
a) the sort of implementation of technological breakthroughs (labor-augmenting vs. 
capital-augmenting implementation) 
b) the magnitude of the increase in (productivity) growth rate of capital-goods 
production ( α/Ag ), which is induced by the implementation of the breakthroughs 
c) the sectors in which the breakthroughs are implemented (implementation in sector A, 
sector B or in both sectors) 
d) the correlation between sector size ( ) and sector technology (BA ll , βα , ) 
e) the difference between sector sizes ( BA ll − ). 
Proof: First, we prove this theorem for a special case; then we argue that this proof can be 
generalized. We first assume a reference case and then show the differences to this reference 
case. 
Reference case: Assume that . Furthermore assume that there is a breakthrough which 
is implemented in both sectors in labor-augmenting manner. According to Assumption 13, the 
BA ll >
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increase in α  ( αΔ ) is larger than the increase in β  ( βΔ ), i.e. βα Δ>Δ , where 0>Δα  and 
0>Δβ . Hence, if βα >  before implementation, the technology-bias ( βα − ) is increased 
by implementation. 
Proof of part a): In contrast to the Reference case, assume that there is a breakthrough which 
is implemented in both sectors in capital-augmenting manner, ceteris paribus. Thus, 
according to Assumption 13, α  decreases more strongly than β  does, i.e. βα Δ>Δ , where 
0<Δα  and 0<Δβ . Hence, if βα >  before implementation, the technology-bias ( βα s 
reduced by implementation, in contrast to the reference case. This fact proves part a) of 
Theorem 3. 
− ) i
Proof of part c): In contrast to the Reference case, assume that there is a breakthrough which 
is implemented in labor-augmenting manner in sector B only, ceteris paribus, i.e. 0=Δα  and 
0>Δβ . Hence, if βα >  before implementation, the technology-bias ( βα − ) is reduced by 
implementation, in contrast to the reference case. This fact proves part c) of Theorem 3. 
Proof of part d): In contrast to the Reference case, assume that βα <  before implementation, 
ceteris paribus. In this case, technology-bias is reduced by implementation, in contrast to the 
Reference case. This fact proves part d) of Theorem 3. 
Proof of part b): Now assume the same situation as in the reference case. As shown there, the 
implementation of the breakthrough increases α  and β , i.e. 0>Δα  and 0>Δβ . Equations 
(27)/(28) imply that these increases change the labor-allocation ( ). If this reallocation 
process is such that  becomes smaller than , the implementation of the next breakthrough 
will yield mirror-image effects on the technology-bias in comparison to the initial reference 
case. That is, this second breakthrough is implemented more strongly in sector B, which 
would reduce the technology-bias. Now, the question is, under which circumstances is the 
reallocation process, which is induced by the first breakthrough, such that  becomes smaller 
than . This can only happen if 
BA ll ,
Al Bl
Al
Bl αβ ∂
∂>∂
∂ AB ll , where + =1.Al Bl 5 In this case it can happen that 
the changes in employment shares overweight the changes in output-elasticities of capital (at 
least after a long sequence of many breakthroughs) such that at some point of time 
breakthroughs become better implementable in sector B. After some algebra it can be shown 
                                                 
5 If αβ ∂
∂≤∂
∂ AB ll ,  cannot become smaller than  during the implementation of the first breakthrough, since 
in this phase 
Al Bl
βα Δ>Δ . That is, if αβ ∂
∂≤∂
∂ AB ll  and if βα Δ>Δ   increases more than . Al Bl
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that αβ ∂
∂>∂ AB ll  can be satisfied only if the change in ∂ α/g , which is induced by the A
implementation of the first breakthrough, is relatively small. (If α/Ag  is relatively large 
αβ ∂
∂<∂ AB ll ). Note that ∂ α/  determines the PBGP-growth rate of capital-goods-production, 
Proof of part e): In the light of proof of part b) we can also postulate, th
Ag
since capital goods are produced in sector A only (see also Lemma 1). 
at  does not become  Al
smaller than Bl  during the first breakthrough, if the increase in α/Ag  is r latively large (but 
not too large) and the difference between Al  and Bl  is rela large before the first 
breakthrough. In this case, the fact that 
e
tively 
αβ ∂
∂>∂
∂ AB ll  cannot overweight the relatively strong 
difference between αΔ  and βΔ . Hence, the difference between  and  (i.e. the difference 
 is e s
nly valid in our 
Al Bl
in implementability) decisiv for the development of the technology bia . 
Note that it can be shown in analogous ways that Theorem 3 is not o
Reference case, but in all the other cases (e.g. if BA ll < ). The proof of this fact is obvious. 
Q.E.D. 
 
We discuss this theorem in Section 6. 
 The impacts of cross-technology structural change 
res of (sub)sectors. That is, 
chnology. 
section we show that cross-technology structural change can affect the technology-
, Baumol (1967), 
ge implies that structural change (across technology) is 
caused by several determinants; especially, non-homothetic preferences (as modeled by 
 
5
We define here structural change as changes in employment sha
we say that structural change takes place if (sub)sectoral employment shares change. It can be 
easily shown that structural change takes place even along the PBGP in our model. 
Cross-technology structural change means here that labor is reallocated across te
Hence, in our model, changes in ( BA ll , ) indicate that cross-technology structural change takes 
place. 
In this 
bias; i.e. structural change can lead to technology convergence/divergence. 
Structural change is a well known fact and has been modeled by, e.g.
Kongamut et al. (2001), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) and 
Foellmi and Zweimueller (2008). 
The literature on structural chan
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Kongsamut et al. 2001), cross-sector-differences in TFP-growth (as modeled by Ngai and 
Pissarides 2007) and cross-sector-differences in capital-intensities (as modeled by Acemoglu 
and Guerrieri 2008). Although all these determinants are included in our model, our 
parameter-restriction (8c,d) prevent them from taking effect across technology; hence, Al  and 
Bl  are constant along the PBGP. Instead of deviating from parameter-restrictions (8c,d), 
which would make our analysis quite complicated, we model structural change as follows: 
e assume that the utility-weights of technology change exogenously; i.e. W Bω  changes. This 
leads to changes in demand and to structural change across technology. Hence, we do not 
model the structural change (mentioned above) explicitly. Note that our way of modeling has, 
in fact, very similar dynamic implications in comparison to the implications of structural 
change models, which model the structural change determinants explicitly. In some sense, our 
way of modeling only omits the microfoundations, which are anyway provided by the 
previous literature. 
 
Lemma 4: A onetime change in Bω  causes a deviation from the old PBGP and convergence to 
e new PBGP. 
 eq
th
Proof: This lemma is implied by uations (C.5) and Lemma 2. Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 4: a) A onetime increase in Bω  induces labor-reallocation from sector A to sector 
, provided thatB  βα > ; i.e.  decreases and  increases. b) A onetime increase in Al Bl Bω  
induces labor-reallocation from sector B to sector A, provided that βα < ; i.e. Al  increases 
and Bl  decreases. e stron er the difference b tween  c) Th g e α  and β , the stronger the change 
in Al  and Bl . d) Analogous results are obtained for the case that ther  onetime decrease 
in 
e is a
Bω . 
Proof: This lemma is implied by equation (25). 
 
Corollary from Theorems 2, 3 and 4: Depending on the structural change pattern (i.e. 
hether w Bω  increases or decreases), structural change may lead to technology convergence 
 is simple: Structural change affects the employment 
hare of a sector and thus sector’s ability to implement a breakthrough. For example, if the 
income elasticity of demand of sector B is relatively high, factors are reallocated to sector B. 
or divergence between sectors A and B. 
 
In fact, the explanation of this corollary
s
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This fact increases the ability of sector B to implement breakthroughs. Hence, if sector B was 
technologically backward in the past, structural change (induced by income elasticity of 
demand) may lead to technology convergence over time. This development may be reflected 
by the reality: the backward sector B may be interpreted as the services sector (or at least as 
some very labor-intensive subsectors of the services sector) that may catch up technologically 
in future due to high income elasticity of demand. 
By using similar arguments a case can be constructed where it may happen that technology 
divergence occurs: if, e.g., income elasticity of demand of the technologically backward 
sector is relatively low, technology divergence may be caused by structural change.  
heorems 2, 3 and 4) we have 
hown the relevance of several factors for the explanation of technology-bias: 
 (labor-augmenting vs. 
 capital-goods 
See also the discussion in section 8 for some further arguments. 
 
6 Summary of factors which determine technology-bias 
In our model (especially in Theorem 3 and in Corollary from T
s
a) the sort of implementation of technological breakthroughs
capital-augmenting implementation) 
b) the magnitude of the increase in the (productivity) growth rate of
production ( α/Ag ), which is induced by the implementation of breakthroughs 
the sectors in which the breakthroughc) s are implemented (implementation in sector A, 
d) 
sector B or in both sectors) 
the correlation between sector size ( BA ll , ) and sector technology ( βα , ) 
e) the difference between sector sizes ( BA ll − ). 
structural change f) 
 
No arding the question why these factors affect the 
dev p y-bias: 
rogress reduces the optimal capital-intensity. Hence, the 
ectors, which implement the breakthroughs, have to increase their labor input in order to 
w we provide intuitive explanations reg
elo ment of technolog
 
a.) The reasons for the relevance of the sort of implementation are the following: In general, 
labor-augmenting technological p
s
profit from the implementation. However, in contrast to capital, labor cannot be accumulated; 
hence, the sectors, which implement the breakthrough, pull labor from sectors, which do not 
implement the breakthrough. Since breakthrough-implementation is more successful in large 
25 
 
sectors than in small sectors6, labor is withdrawn from small sectors and reallocated to large 
sectors. This fact reduces the ability of small sectors to implement future breakthroughs (less 
creative potential). In contrast, capital-augmenting implementation increases the capital 
intensity. Hence, big sectors can release some part of their labor-force, since it can be 
substituted by capital (which can be accumulated endogenously). This labor-force is 
reallocated to small sectors, which increases their creative potential and thus ability to 
implement future breakthroughs. (See also the Corollaries from Theorems 1 and 2.) 
 
b.) If productivity of capital-goods-production is increased by implementation of 
reakthroughs, factors are reallocated to the sector, which produces capital. This factor-
s but seems to be relatively important. For example, if 
reakthroughs are such that they can only be implemented in the progressive sector, 
 some mechanisms, which 
orrelate the employment share with the output-elasticity of labor (see Theorem 2), it is 
                                                
b
reallocation affects the ability of these sectors to implement future breakthroughs. Thus, the 
development of the technology bias is affected by this fact. This effect arises only if capital-
goods-production is not evenly distributed across all sectors. In our model this is the case: 
only sector A produces capital-goods. (Thus, the productivity of sector A corresponds to 
productivity of capital-goods-production.) Empirical evidence implies that this assumption is 
preferable: e.g. in the USA, capital-goods are produced primarily by the manufacturing sector 
and output-elasticity of capital differs across consumption-goods and capital-goods; see e.g. 
Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008). 
 
c.) This point is relatively obviou
b
technology-bias increases. It may be possible that nature of the development-process is such 
that it features different phases, where in early phases some breakthroughs occur which can be 
implemented primarily in manufacturing and where in later phases breakthroughs occur, 
which can be implementation in some (personal) services sectors. 
 
d.) Despite of our model results, which postulate that there are
c
possible to deviate from this scheme. For example, we have shown in the previous section that 
income elasticity of demand may cause deviations from this scheme. Hence, it is possible that 
large sectors (large employment shares) are associated with low output-elasticity of labor, if 
their income elasticity of demand is relatively large. The fact, that the correlation between 
 
6 Remember that large sectors have more “creative power”; hence a large sector is feasible to increase its 
productivity strongly by implementation, whereas a small sector can increase its productivity hardly by 
implementation. 
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employment share and output-elasticity may be important regarding the technology-bias, is 
relatively obvious: If progressive sectors have high employment shares (negative correlation 
between output-elasticity and employment shares), implementation in progressive sectors is 
more successful than in implementation in backward sectors, hence technology-bias increases. 
Otherwise, if progressive sectors have low employment shares (positive correlation), 
implementation will be less successful, and backward sectors catch up (technology-bias 
decreases). 
 
e.) We assume that the difference in sector size determines how strong the difference in 
plementation of breakthroughs across sectors is. If there are very small sectors and very 
section, structural change is caused by several determinants. 
ence, all these determinants affect the cross-sector-factor allocation and thus relative 
d here, but 
hich affect the model outcome. These factors rather depend on the nature of the 
e of the breakthrough whether it is 
 implement the same 
sector; which would yield technology 
im
large sectors in an economy, the differences in technology are large (according to our model) 
and may be difficult to overweight by other effects (e.g. those from point b)), as seen in the 
proof of Effect b) in Theorem 3. 
 
f.) As mentioned in the previous 
H
abilities to implement breakthroughs. For further discussion see previous section. 
 
Last not least, there are several further factors, which are not explicitly modele
w
breakthrough and/or on the nature sectoral output. Some discussion of the nature of sectors 
and its implications for the scope of technological progress can be found, e.g. in the essays by 
Wolfe (1955), Baumol (1967) and Klevorick et al. (1995). 
1.) It may happen that some breakthroughs are rather implementable in capital-augmenting or 
labor-augmenting way. That is, it may depend on the natur
primarily labor-augmentingly or capital-augmentingly implemented.  
2.) Some sectors (e.g. services) may implement a breakthrough (e.g. electricity) in a primarily 
labor-augmenting way and other sector (e.g. agriculture) may
breakthrough (electricity) in a primarily capital-augmenting way. This could yield 
technology-divergence. That is, in which way the breakthroughs are primarily implemented 
may depend on the nature of the output of a sector. 
3.) Simply speaking, it may also be accidental that over some period of time breakthroughs 
occur, which are implementable in only one 
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convergence. As well technical feasibility may dictate the order of breakthroughs and thus 
development of the technology-bias. 
 
Overall, there seems to be some accidental or technical component which determines the 
mely order of breakthroughs and their implementability in a sector. 
 Empirical evidence on technology convergence 
 this section we construct a simple measure of cross-sector technology-bias and analyze its 
ral labor-income shares as 
ti
 
 
7
In
development over time. Since quite easy measurable, we use secto
indices of sectoral technology (output-elasticity of labor). 
The measure of technology-bias, which we suggest is the following: 
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 i denotes sector;  is the labor-income share of sector i at time t (or approximately 
output-elasticity of labor);  is the employment-share of sector i at time t;  is the 
 variance-calculation, since 
where tiα
t
il
0
il
employment-share of sector i at the beginning of the observation period; T  is the 
employment-share of sector i at the end of the observation period. 
That is, our measure of cross-sector technology variation is simply a variance. Note that it 
makes sense to use the employment-shares as weighting-factors in
il
it is theoretically reasonable: 
wL
Y
wL
Yp
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Ypll i
ii
ii
ii ===
i ii i
∑∑∑ α1 . Hence, this term is equal 
to the reciprocal of the aggregate labor-income-share. 
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Note that we do not use the actual employment-shares to calculate the technology-variance, 
m the beginning of the observation p
of the period.) The reason for 
estic-Product-(GDP)-by-Industry-Data, which is based on the sector-definition 
m data for longer time-
 Industrial Classification System” has been 
e (hence, the sector definition after 1987 is not the same as the sector 
but the employment-shares fro eriod. (For control we also 
calculate the variance by using employment-shares at the end 
this is that the employment shares change over time and they would eventually bias the 
technology development. Hence, with actual employment shares we could not say whether the 
technology-variance decreased or whether some changes in employment-shares led to the 
result. 
For the calculations in this section I use the data for the U.S.A., which is available at the web-
site of the U.S. Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis). I use the U.S.-
Gross-Dom
from the “Standard Industrial Classification System”, which defines the following sectors: 
(1) Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
(2) Mining 
(3) Construction 
(4) Manufacturing 
(5) Transportation and public utilities 
(6) Wholesale trade 
(7) Retail trade 
(8) Finance, insurance, and real estate 
(9) Services 
 
My calculations are based on the data for the period 1948-1987. Unifor
periods is not available, since the “Standard
modified over tim
definition before 1987).  
To calculate the sectoral labor-income-shares ( iα ) I divide “(Nominal) Compensation of 
Employees” by “(Nominal) Value Added by Industry” in each sector. The sectoral 
employment shares ( il ) are calculated by us ectoral data on “Full-time Equivalent ing the s
Employees”. (This approach is similar to that used by Acemogu and Guerrieri (2008)). 
 
The following two figures depict the development of the two measures over time: 
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Both measures imply that the cross-sector technology-variance is decreasing. Hence, it seems 
at technologies converged during the observation period. 
ess has been capital-augmenting; 
These explanations are discussed in the next chapter. 
th
In fact, our model-explanations of this finding are: 
- Over the long-run in the past, technological progr
hence technologies are converging now.  
- Structural change has increased the employment in technologically backward sectors 
much. Therefore, they are able to implement new breakthroughs and are catching-up. 
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8 Rele  
.1 GDP-growth-slow-down 
. Examples of this literature are the papers by Baumol (1967), Baumol 
arides (2007), Nordhaus (2008) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri 
eneous sectors; especially, this 
terature assumes that output-elasticities of inputs (i.e. the
vance of the results for existing literature and an interesting topic for
further research 
8
The results of this paper are closely related to the theoretical and empirical literature on 
Baumol’s cost disease
et al. (1985), Ngai and Piss
(2008). In fact this literature implies that factors are reallocated to technologically backward 
sectors. In part, this literature implies that therefore the real GDP-growth rate decreases over 
time. Our model and our empirical evidence imply that this reallocation process can lead to 
technological catching-up of backward sectors. Hence, the technologies may converge over 
the very long-run. Therefore, the slow-down of the real GDP-growth rate may cease and 
structural change may slow-down (since in this literature the technology-bias is a key 
determinant of the direction and strength of structural change). 
 
8.2 Microfoundation and additional structural change determinants 
There is some literature, which models technologically heterog
 iαli ’s) differ across sectors, but 
ls by Kongsamut et al. 
 4). 
assumes that this technology-bias is exogenous. Examples are the mode
(1997), Echevarria (1997, 2000), Golin et al (2002), Meckl (2002), Jensen and Larsen (2004), 
Greenwood and Uysal (2005), Bah (2007), Golin et al. (2007), Zuleta and Young (2007), 
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) and Buera and Kaboski (2009). Our model adds a micro-
foundation of the technology-bias of these models. Especially, our model and our empirical 
evidence imply that this technology-bias may vanish in the future and, thus, complicated 
modeling of this technology-bias may not be necessary. Furthermore, our model implies that 
the predictions of these models regarding the structural change dynamics may be biased. Our 
model results imply that when the technology-bias is endogenized several relationships 
between structural change and technology arise, which are omitted in the models with 
exogenous technology-bias: 
1.) Technology implementation causes by itself structural change (Theorem 2) 
2.) Technology-change slows-down/accelerates structural change patterns (Theorem 2 and 
4c). 
3.) Structural change affects technology-bias (Corollary from Theorems 2, 3 and
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In f
section 6), are themselves structural change determinants. Hence, they could be added to the 
trad thetic 
erences 
 factor-income-shares are not compatible with the relatively stable development of the 
scribed by “Kaldor’s stylized facts of economic growth”. 
logy-
 and not technology shocks in our model, our 
odel postulates a much stronger importance of structural change for aggregate growth than 
l change models”, the current 
act point 1) implies that all the factors, which determine technology implementation (see 
itional structural change determinants, which are studied in the literature (non-homo
preferences, exogenous TFP-bias and exogenous bias in output-elasticities of inputs). 
 
8.3 Explanation of stylized facts 
The theoretical results by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) imply that cross-sector-diff
in
aggregate economy, which is de
(This result is supported by Kongsamut et al. (1997)). Nevertheless, in the simulation of their 
model they find that the model satisfies the Kaldor-facts approximately. Our model and our 
empirical evidence imply the following explanation of this fact: It is possible that the sectoral 
technologies have already converged significantly. Hence, the cross technology-bias is 
sufficiently small and has therefore relatively weak impacts on the aggregate economy.  
Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) show that capital-income shares are relatively similar at 
low degree of disaggregation (i.e. when comparing manufacturing and services). Our model 
and our empirical evidence imply that this finding may have come from the techno
convergence-tendencies described in our paper. 
 
8.4 Structural change as a determinant of technology paths 
Since we study implementation of breakthroughs
m
standard structural change models do. In “general structura
factor allocation affects the current productivity of factor use (the current “aggregate 
technology”). In contrast, in our model the current factor allocation determines how a future 
path of technology innovation is implemented. (A breakthrough in our model is associated 
with a change in the growth rate of technological progress.) Hence, e.g., if relatively high 
income elasticity of demand for services yields a very high employment share in services, 
breakthroughs are implemented in the services sector primarily. (The many possible 
implementations/inventions in, e.g., the agricultural or manufacturing sector are “wasted”, 
since only little labor is employed in the agricultural/manufacturing sector. Those inventions 
in the agricultural/manufacturing sector may have been the basis for further groundbreaking 
inventions.) 
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8.5 Relevance for endogenous growth theory 
Last not least, neoclassical endogenous growth theory studies aggregate production functions 
r: aggregate technological progress). However, aggregate production functions are some 
ctions. Hence, an endogenous growth theory 
nce, these models are not consistent with the empirical facts of technological 
ent. A very simplified description of 
ion (?? Structural change) ? Increase in aggregate 
roduce a different change 
y all the structural change determinants, which have been discussed in sections 6 
ed to explain the development of the 
chnology-bias in a country over a relatively long period of time. This is not difficult to do 
ted several examples of 
possible cases; furthermore, we have elaborated there how the factors, which determine the 
(o
weighted averages of sectoral production fun
without the study of the question how technologies are implemented at sector level seems to 
be incomplete.  
In general, endogenous growth theory includes models with heterogeneous goods/”sectors”; 
however, the production functions of these “sectors” do not feature significant technological 
heterogeneity; he
heterogeneity of sectors; compare e.g. Krueger (2008). 
Since our model is neoclassical in many aspects, our model may be regarded as a contribution 
to the neoclassical endogenous growth theory, especially regarding models where 
technological change arises from research and developm
such a R&D-model may be the following: factors are devoted to research activities; the 
“output” of these research activities is an increase in aggregate productivity. This line of 
arguments can be depicted as follows:  
Resources ? Research ? Increase in aggregate productivity 
Our model adds an additional argument in this chain of arguments: 
Resources ? Research ? Implementat
productivity 
That is, one and the same resource-input in research activities can p
in aggregate productivity, depending upon the sector structure. (This sector structure is 
determined b
and 7.) This sector structure determines how research output is implemented today and in 
future. This argument may be useful in generating a microfoundation of increasing/decreasing 
returns-to-scale in research. For example, a constant research input may produce smaller and 
smaller increases in aggregate productivity over time, if e.g. non-homothetic preferences shift 
demand to sectors, in which implementability is low. 
 
8.6 Limit development over an infinite sequence of breakthroughs 
Our results and especially Theorem 3 could be us
te
by using our results. In the proof of Theorem 3 we have elabora
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technology-bias, affect each other. Thus, our model-results could be used to analyze which 
combinations of determining factors exist in a country and to explain this country’s 
technology-bias-development. The data, which is necessary for such an exercise, includes: 
sectoral employment shares, sectoral output-elasticities of inputs (and TFP-growth rates) and 
the sort of technological progress in sectors. 
However, it may be interesting to analyze how an economy behaves over an infinite sequence 
of technological breakthroughs. This can be done as follows: 
Assume that there is a sequence of points in time ∞= ,...2,1τ . At each of these points in time a 
breakthrough happens. Assume, furthermore, the following: 
lemented, the change in 
- the technology breakthroughs are not too influental on the economy; i.e., only little 
implementation is possible; i.e. when breakthroughs are imp α  and 
β  is relatively small and/or 
- the periods of time between points ∞= ,...2,1τ  are relatively large. 
These assumptions imply that we can assume that at each point ∞= ,...2,1τ  the economy is 
very close to the PBGP. Hence, we can approximate the employment shares by using the 
GP-employment shares (ePB quations (25)/(26)). 
entation o ays capital-augmenting. 
ollowing difference equation system: 
As an example assume that implem f breakthroughs is alw
Furthermore, assume that the implementability of the breakthroughs is not sector-dependent, 
but is only dependent on the employment-shares of the sector. 
By using these assumptions we can postulate the f
(33) )1( *1 τττ αα Bl−Δ−=+  
(34) )( *1 τττ ββ BlΔ−=+  
where it follows from equation (25) that 
ρ
α
(35) 
δρ g++
αωαβ
ρ
αδραα
β
τ
τττ
τ
ττ
ττ
A
L
B
A
L
B g
gg
l
+
+−
+++
+−
=
)(
1
*  
Furthermore, it follows from equation (26) that 
that in both difference equations the functional form
**1 ττ AB ll =− . 
Note  (.)Δ  is the same; this fact is due to 
assumption that implementability does not depend upon sector but only upon sectoral 
employment. 
Reasonable assumptions for the function Δ  are: 
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(36) 0)0(,0
)1(
)1(,0)(,0(.) *
*
*
*
=Δ>−∂
−Δ∂>∂
Δ∂≥Δ
τ
τ
τ
τ
B
B
B
B
l
l
l
l
The first of th
 
ese assumptions is due to our assumption that implementation is only capital-
augmenting; hence, α  and β  are reduced at every point of time τ  (see also Assumption 13). 
econd, third and fourth assumptions in (36) are resulting from Assumption 12. 
Since the analysis of difference equation systems is relatively difficult (because results of 
The s
phase diagrams are not unambiguous), and since anyway we are interested only in the 
development of the technology bias ( βα − ), the difference-equa ion-system (33)-(34) could 
be transformed into a single difference-equation as follows: 
t
(37) )( *1 τττ BlGDD +=+  
where τττ βα −≡D  and )()1()( *** τlllG Δ+−Δ−≡  
diagram. The preliminary analysis of this system, which we h
ττ BBB
The analysis of this differential equation is relatively comfortable: it can be done in a phase 
ave done by now and which will 
blished in a sepa te paper, implies that the dynamic path of the technology-bias 
ve very different features depending upon the parameters, which determine the savings 
τD  be pu ra
may ha
rate ( LA gg ,,, δρ ), and factors, which are elaborated in Theorem 3. For example, there may 
be cycles in the development of the bias. A detailed discussion of this analysis will be 
provided in a separate paper. 
 
9 Concluding remarks 
We have presented a model of technology-implementation at sector level. We have elaborated 
several aspects of this process, which can explain and predict the development of the 
chnology-bias at sector level. The focus of our model has been on the technology-bias 
output-elasticities of inputs and factor-income-shares. That is, 
ing implementation) 
te
regarding capital-intensities, 
we have analyzed why output-elasticity of capital (and thus capital-intensity) is different 
across sectors and how this technology-bias develops over time. These questions are 
important, since many models assume the existence of such a technology-bias and since 
endogenous technology-bias would affect their results. These aspects among others have been 
discussed in section 8. 
As discussed in section 6, our model provides several factors which determine whether 
technologies converge/diverge at sector level: 
- the sort of implementation of technological breakthroughs (labor-augmenting vs. 
capital-augment
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- the magnitude of the increase in (productivity) growth rate of capital-goods 
production, which is induced by the implementation of the breakthroughs 
Of u
(restricted) period of time in a country and then to explain the technology-bias-development 
of  
withou
er, the benefit of such an analysis may be questionable: As shown 
analysis. However, this is not true and maybe the most important result of our paper is the 
- the nature of the breakthrough (In which sector can the breakthrough be 
implemented?) 
- structural change (Structural change determines the (relative) ability of sectors to 
implement breakthroughs.) 
co rse, it is possible to elaborate which combinations of these factors exist over some 
the country. As discussed in section 8.6, by using our results this exercise can be done 
t many difficulties. 
Furthermore, it is possible to analyze the limit development of the economy. That is, we could 
assume that there is an infinite sequence of (similar) breakthroughs and then we could analyze 
how the economy develops over this sequence. In Section 8.6 we have elaborated an approach 
to such an analysis. Howev
in Section 8.6, such limit analysis can be done only if we assume a specific combination of 
“determining factors”. (“Determining factors” means here factors which determine the 
technology-bias; they are elaborated in Theorem 3.) For example, we would have to assume 
that from now to infinity breakthroughs are implemented only in capital-augmenting manner. 
However, we have no reason to assume that these determining factors are constant over a very 
long period of time. We guess that a key-aspect of technological development is frequent 
change in determining factor-combinations, e.g. progress is sometimes labor-augmenting and 
sometimes capital-augmenting. Therefore, we guess that the most practicable way of using 
our results for explaining the development of technology-bias over a given (past) period of 
time is the one, which is discussed in the previous paragraph and in the beginning of Section 
8.6: use the results of Theorem 3 to elaborate the existing combinations of “determining 
factors” over a period of time; then, explain the development of technology-bias by using the 
Theorems of our paper, like we did in the examples of the proof of Theorem 3. 
Overall, we can say that our model implies that it is difficult to extrapolate the future 
development of technology-bias from past development. In fact, we show that many factors 
determine the technology-bias, and there is no reason to assume that these factors will not 
change in future. 
 
It may seem that many of our results are “obvious”, i.e. they can be derived by verbal 
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proof that such “obvious” verbal arguments hold when using a microfoundation. In general, a 
change in model-parameters (e.g. a technological breakthrough) may shift a modeled system 
 a qualitatively very different growth path. The effects of this shift may overweight all the 
 of technologically-backward sectors) has increased 
e ability of backward-sectors to implement general technological breakthroughs. 
ndation of 
tructural change literature, structural change determinants implied by our results, 
g to study the question of how do patent rights 
onopolistic competition) and implementation-research-costs affect technological 
to
obvious verbally derived results. Hence, we can never say a priori (i.e. without 
microfoundation) whether such verbally derived results hold. In our paper we have shown that 
(locally) stable equilibriums exist and that transition-paths retain their qualitative features 
even if there is a technology change. That is, we have shown that development paths exist 
along which all the results of “obvious” verbal analysis hold. However, a very interesting 
question for further research is to analyze whether in alternative multi-sector models 
technology-implementation can shift the economy to very different growth paths and thus 
overturn all the “obvious” verbal results. 
 
Our empirical evidence (in section 7) implies that technologies have converged in the USA 
between 1948 and 1987. Our model explanation of this fact is that technological 
breakthroughs have been implemented in capital-augmenting manner in the past and that 
structural change (increasing factor-shares
th
 
Furthermore, we have discussed several implications of our model for the growth and 
structural change literature in the previous section. Especially, we have discussed the 
following topics: relevance of our results for the literature on the slow-down of GDP-growth 
and for the endogenous growth-literature, relevance of our model as a microfou
s
implications of our results for the explanation of Kaldor-facts and the relevance of structural 
change as a determinant of technology-paths. 
 
Note that our model may be regarded as a baseline model only; it shows how technology 
implementation and cross-sector technology-bias can be modeled. It could be used to study 
several further questions, which are important for cross-sector technology convergence. 
Especially, we think that it could be interestin
(m
convergence. In part, this fact has been studied by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2006), in a model 
where TFP-bias is endogenized. Introducing patent rights and research costs into our model is 
a quite challenging task and it would change the quantitative results. In fact, employment 
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shares and capital-intensities would be different in comparison to our baseline model; 
however, we do not believe that this modification could change our key qualitative results 
(regarding the determinants of technology bias).  
We assumed that preferences are independent of technology. It would be interesting (although 
very challenging) to see what happens if, e.g., income elasticity of demand is correlated with 
output-elasticity of capital. On the other hand, we have “approximated” such dependency in 
section 5; furthermore, it seems to be difficult to defend such a dependency assumption in 
long run modeling. 
Note that we assumed that breakthroughs are not foreseen by individual households; however, 
since in our analysis we compared different stationary points (PBGP’s), and not transitional 
dynamics, this simplifying assumption does not change our results significantly. (If the 
households foresaw the breakthroughs, the consumption paths would be smoother, but the 
equilibriums (PBGP’s) would not change qualitatively.)  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to analyze which specification of our model depicts the 
reality of different country groups (developing countries, industrialized countries,…) by using 
empirical data. 
Last not least, there is the limit-analysis, which we have presented in Section 8.6. We will 
provide the results of this analysis in a separate paper. 
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APPENDIX 
irst, I show by using linear approximation that the saddle-path-feature of the PBGP is given 
emma 2a). Then I prove local stability by using a phase diagram (Lemma 2b). 
xistence of a saddle-path (Lemma 2a) 
e the aggregate equation system (22)-(24) as follows: 
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where aggregate variables are expressed in “labor-efficiency units”, i.e. they are divided by 
α
1
LA ; hence 
α
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KK ≡  and 
α
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ˆ
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EE ≡ .  
These equations imply that  and  have the following values along the PBGP EK ˆ,ˆ mm kl /
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where 
αρδ
ασ
A
L
gg +++
−≡ 1  
where an asterisk denotes the PBGP- onding variable. 
The proof of local saddle-path-stability of the PBGP is analogous to the proof by Acemoglu 
and Guerrieri (2008) (see there for details and see also Acemoglu (2009), pp. 269-273, 926). 
 to show that th terminant of the Jacobian of the differential equation system 
(C.1)-(C.2) (where  is given by equation (C.3)) is different from zero when evaluated at 
value of the corresp
First, I have e de
mm kl /
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the PBGP (i.e. for 
*
** ,ˆ,ˆ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
m
m
k
lEK  from equations (C.4)-(C.6)). This implies that this 
differential equation system is hyperbolic and can be linearly approximated around 
*
⎠
⎞
⎝
⎛
mk
l** ,ˆ,ˆ ⎟⎟⎜⎜ mEK  (Grobman-Hartman-Theorem; see as well Acemoglu (2009), p. 926, and 
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)). The determinant of the Jacobian is given by: 
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The derivatives of equations (C.1)-(C.2) are given by: 
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where the derivatives of equation (C.3) are given by  
k
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 (C.9) 
Inserting the derivatives (C.8) and (C.9) into (C.7) and inserting the PBGP-values from 
equations (C.4)-(C.6) yields after some algebra the following value of the determinant of the 
Jacobian evaluated at the PBGP: 
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This equation can be transformed further by using equations (C.4)-(C.6): 
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Note that 
*
*
ˆ
ˆ
K
E  and 
*
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
m
m
k
l are positive and are given by equations (C.4)-(C.6).  
We can see that the determinant evaluated at PBGP is different form zero. Hence, the PBGP 
is hyperbolic. Furthermore, equations (C.10) and (C.11) imply that 0* <J . (Equation (C.10) 
implies that 0* <J , if 0>−αβ ; equation (C.11) implies that 0* <J , if 0<−αβ  as well.) 
Our differential equation system consists of two differential equations ((C.1) and (C.2)) and of 
two variables ( Eˆ  and Kˆ ), where we have one state and one control-variable. Hence, saddle-
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path-stability of the PBGP requires that there exist one negative (and one positive) eigenvalue 
of the differential equation system when evaluated at PBGP (see also Acemoglu and Guerrieri 
(2008) and Acemoglu (2009), pp. 269-273). Since 0* <J  we can be sure that this is the case. 
( 0* <J  can exist only if one eigenvalue is positive and the other eigenvalue is negative. If 
both eigenvalues were negative or if both eigenvalues were positive, the determinant *J  
would be positive.) Therefore, the PBGP is locally saddle-path-stable, i.e. Lemma 2a is 
proved. Q.E.D. 
 
Local stability (Lemma 2b) 
I study here only the case where output-elasticity of capital in investment goods industries 
(i=m) is relatively low in comparison to the output-elasticity of capital in the consumption 
goods industries ( ), i.e. I assume mi ≠∀ αβ < . This is consistent with the empirical evidence 
presented and discussed in Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) (see there especially p.826). 
Note, however, that the qualitative stability results for the other case (i.e. αβ > ) are the 
same. 
To show the stability-features of the PBGP, the three-dimensional system (C.1)-(C.3) has to 
be transformed into a two dimensional system, in order to allow me using a phase-diagram. 
By defining the variable 
m
m
l
kKˆ≡κ , the system (C.1)-(C.3) can be reformulated as follows 
(after some algebra): 
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I can focus attention on showing that the stationary point of this differential equation system 
is stable: κ  and Eˆ  are jointly in steady state only if Kˆ , Eˆ  and  are jointly in steady 
state; furthermore, 
mm lk /
Kˆ , Eˆ  and  are jointly in steady state only if mm lk / κ  and Eˆ  are jointly in 
steady state. Therefore, the proof of stability of the stationary point of system (C.12)-(C.13) 
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implies stability of the stationary point of system (C.1)-(C.3). Hence, in the following I will 
prove stability of the stationary point of system (C.12)-(C.13). 
It follows from equations (C.12) and (C.13) that the steady-state-loci of the two variables are 
given by 
(C.12a) 
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Now, I could depict the differential equation system (C.12)-(C.13) in the phase space ( ). 
Before doing so, I show that not the whole phase space ( ) is economically meaningful. 
The economically meaningful phase-space is restricted by three curves ( ), as shown 
in the following figure and as derived below: 
κ,Eˆ
κ,Eˆ
321 ,, tt RRR
 
Figure C.1: Relevant space of the phase diagram 
 
κ  
Eˆ  
1R  
3
0=tR  
2
0=tR  
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Only the space below the 1R -line is economically meaningful, since the employment-share of 
at least one sub-sector i is negative in the space above the 1R -line. This can be seen from the 
following fact: 
It follows from equations (3) and (7a,b) after some algebra that 
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Inserting equation (C.3) into this relation yields 
(C.16) ακωβ
α −< 11 1ˆ:
B
ER  
Hence, the space above 1R  is not feasible. When the economy reaches a point on 1R , no labor 
is used in sub-sectors i=1,…m. If I impose Inada-conditions on the production functions, as 
usual, this means that the output of sub-sectors i=1,…m is equal to zero, which means that the 
consumption of these sectors is equal to zero. Our utility function implies that life-time utility 
is infinitely negative in this case. Hence, the household prefers not to be at the 1R -curve. Note 
that actually the 1R -curve is only an outer limit: Since we have existence-minima in our 
utility function, the utility function becomes infinitely negative when the consumption of one 
of these goods falls below its subsistence level. Hence, even when the consumption of all 
goods is positive, it may be the case that the utility function is infinitely negative due to 
violation of some existence minima. Therefore, the actual constraint is somewhere below the 
1R -curve. However, this fact does not change the qualitative results of the stability analysis. 
Now I turn to the  and -curves. I have to take account of the non-negativity-constraints 
on consumption ( ), since our Stone-Geary-type utility function can give rise to 
negative consumption. By using equations (7c), (11b), (12d), (15), (16b) and (19) the non-
negativity-constraints ( ) can be transformed as follows:  
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This set of constraints implies that at any point of time only two constraints are binding, 
namely those with respectively the largest 
i
i
ω
θ− . Hence, the set (C.17), (C.18) can be reduced 
to the following set: 
(C.19) 
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These constraints are time-dependent. It depends upon the parameter setting whether  or 
whether  is binding at a point of time. In Figure C.1 I have depicted examples for these 
constraints for the initial state of the system. Only the space above the constraints is 
economically meaningful, since below the constraints the consumption of at least one good is 
negative. Last not least, note that equations (C.19)/(C.20) imply that the -curve and the 
-curve converge to the axes of the phase-diagram as time approaches infinity.  
2
tR
3
tR
2
tR
3
tR
Now, I depict the differential equation system (C.12)-(C.13) in the phase space ( ). κ,Eˆ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Figure C.2: The differential equation system (C.12)-(C.13) in the phase-space for 
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Note that I have depicted here only the relevant (or: binding) parts of the restriction-set of 
Figure C.1 as a bold line R. 
As we can see, the 0=κ& -locus has a pole at αβαρω
αακ
1
)(
)1(
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=
B
pole . 
The phase diagram implies that there must be a saddle-path along which the system converges 
to the stationary point S (where S is actually the PBGP). The length of the saddle-path is 
restricted by the restrictions of the meaningful space  (bold line). In other words, 
only if the initial 
321 ,, tt RRR
κ  ( 0κ ) is somewhere between 0κ  and κ 7, the economy can be on the 
saddle-path. Therefore, the system can be only locally saddle-path stable. Now, I have to 
                                                 
7 Note that κ  must be somewhat smaller than depicted in this diagram, since, as discussed above, 1R -curve is 
only an „outer limit“. 
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show that the system will be on the saddle-path if κκκ << 00 . Furthermore, I have to discuss 
what happens if 0κ  is not within this range. 
Every trajectory, which starts above the saddle-path or left from 0κ  , reaches the 1R -curve in 
finite time. As discussed above, the life-time utility becomes infinitely negative if the 
household reaches the 1R -curve. These arguments imply that the representative household 
will never choose to start above the saddle path if κκκ << 00 , since all the trajectories above 
the saddle-path lead to a state where life-time-utility is infinitely negative. 
Furthermore, all initial points that are situated below the saddle-path or right from κ  
converge to the point T. If the system reaches one of the constraints ( ) during this 
convergence process, it moves along the binding constraint towards T. However, the 
transversality condition is violated in T. Therefore, T is not an equilibrium. To see that the 
transversality condition is violated in T consider the following facts: The transversality 
condition is given by , where 
32 , tt RR
0lim >−→∞
t
t
Ke ρψ ψ  is the costate variable in the Hamiltonian 
function (shadow-price of capital). This transversality condition can be reformulated such that 
we obtain: 0)1(lim >−−−− −∞→ αδκα
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However, equation (C.13a) implies that in point T in Figure C.2 
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the transversality condition is violated if the system converges to point T.  
 
Overall, we know that, if κκκ << 00 , the household always decides to be on the saddle-path. 
Hence, we know that for κκκ << 00  the economy converges to the PBGP. In this sense, the 
PBGP is locally stable (within the range κκκ << 00 ). 
If the initial capital is to small ( 00 κκ < ), the economy converges to a state where some 
existence minima are not satisfied (curve 1R ) and thus utility becomes infinitely negative. 
This may be interpreted as a development trap. For example, Malthusian theories imply that 
in this case some part of the population dies, which would yield an increase in per-capita-
capital (and hence an increase in 0κ ). 
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On the other hand, if initial capital-level is too large ( κκ >0 ), all trajectories violate the 
transversality condition. Therefore, in this case, the representative household must waste a 
part of its initial capital to come into the feasible area ( κκκ << 00 ). This case may be 
interpreted as a “development trap of the rich”. 
Furthermore, note that there are always some happenings that reduce the capital stock, e.g. 
wars (like the Second World War) or natural catastrophes. These happenings could shift the 
economy into feasible space ( κκκ << 00 ).  
Note that equation (C.3) and definition 
m
m
l
kKˆ≡κ  imply that κ  is a strictly monotonously 
increasing function of K  in the relevant space of the phase diagram (ceteris paribus). 
Hence, the κ -ranges which determine the ranges of the “development trap”, the local stability 
and the “development trap of the rich” can be directly transformed into K -ranges. That is, if 
initial capital ( ) is relatively low, the economy is in the “development trap”; if  is 
relatively high, the economy is in the “development trap of the rich”; if  is somewhere 
inbetween the economy is in the space of local stability. 
0K 0K
0K
 
Note that Figure C.2 depicts the phase diagram for parameter constellations, which satisfy the 
condition 
αδ
βαρω
αα
A
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B
gg ++
<−
− 1
)(
)1( . For parameter constellations, which satisfy the 
condition 
αδ
βαρω
αα
A
L
B
gg ++
>−
− 1
)(
)1( , the discussion and the qualitative results are nearly the 
same. The only difference is that the 0=κ& -locus is humpshaped (concave) for poleκκ < . 
However, all the qualitative results remain the same (local stability of PBGP for some range 
κκκ << 00  and “infeasibility” for 00 κκ <  and κκ >0 ). Q.E.D. 
 
 
